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Property law in the twentieth century moved from the law of things to the
law of rights in things. This was a process of fragmentation: Under Hohfeldian
property, we conceive of property as a bundle of sticks, and those sticks can
be moved to different holders; the right to possess can be separated from
the record ownership right, for example. The downside of Hohfeld’s model
is that physical objects—things—become informationally complicated. Thingness constrains the extravagances of Hohfeldian property: although we can
split off the right to possess from the right to exclude, use, destroy, copy,
manage, repair, and so on, there is a gravitational pull to tie these sticks
back into a useful bundle centered on the asset, the thing. Correspondingly,
there has been an “informational turn” to property law, looking at the ways in
which property law serves to limit property forms to reduce search costs, and
to identify and celebrate the informational characteristics of thing-ness. The
question of thing-ness came to a head in the context of digital and smart assets
with the formation of non-fungible tokens. NFTs were attempts to generate
and sell “things,” a conceptually coherent something that can contain a loose
bundle of rights. The project was an attempt to re-create thing-ness by an
amalgam of cryptography, game theory, and intellectual property. This essay
discusses thing-ness in the context of digital assets, how simulated thing-ness
differs from physical thing-ness, and the problems that arise from attempts to
reify digital assets.
KEYWORDS
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Introduction
Property law in the twentieth century moved from the law of things to the law of
rights in things. This was a process of fragmentation: Under Hohfeldian property, we
conceive of property as a bundle of sticks, and those sticks can be moved to different
holders; the right to possess can be separated from the record ownership right, for
example. The downside of Hohfeld’s model is that physical objects–things–become
informationally complicated. A simple farm can have complex arrangements of owners,
easements, and servitudes. Things no longer contain and constrain complexity within
themselves.
Thing-ness constrains the extravagances of Hohfeldian property: although we can
split off the right to possess from the right to exclude, use, destroy, copy, manage, repair,
and so on, there is a gravitational pull to tie these sticks back into a useful bundle
centered on the asset, the thing. Conceptions of thing-ness helps with this process by
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thing-ness differs from physical thing-ness, and the
informational problems that arise from attempts to reify
digital assets. It thus attempts to do two things at once: to
discuss what information-based property theory can say about
the attempt to create digital things, and what the strong
and clear example of NFTs can do to forward and develop
property theory.

conveying information quickly and easily (the person wearing
the watch is probably its owner), by providing smooth and
modular interfaces that contain complexity (think about the
complexity of a car engine constrained within the thing-ness
of the car, or of the complexities of circuits contained within a
laptop, or the like), and reduce the number of property forms so
that people searching for property do not incur large search costs
due to uncertainty about what they will buy. Correspondingly,
Henry Smith, Tom Merrill, Christina Mulligan, I myself, and
others have taken what I term an “informational turn” to
property law, looking at the ways in which property law serves to
limit property forms to reduce search costs, and to identify and
celebrate the informational characteristics of thing-ness.
The question of thing-ness came to a head in the context
of digital and smart assets with the formation of Non-fungible
tokens. NFTs were attempts to generate and sell “things,”
a conceptually coherent something that can contain a loose
bundle of rights. The project was an attempt to re-create
thing-ness by an amalgam of cryptography, game theory, and
intellectual property. An NFT is a loosely bundled mixture of
a cryptographic token often hyperlinked (or otherwise loosely
associated) with a piece of intellectual property–a jpeg, for
example. The social description of an NFT as a thing gives
the NFT, the amalgam, a conceptual box that bounds what
is bought and sold. The resulting loose associations have had
enormous success as rivalrous, scarce, valuable digital “things” in
communities of collectors who are enamored of the uniqueness
component offered by the digital ledger, and the sense of
scarcity it imparts to what are otherwise standard easily copyable
computer files. They have also suffered enormous setbacks
because of the same issues. NFTs are mulcted as being “nothing,”
and thus worth nothing, when the thing-ness process fails.
The question is how “solid” the thing-ness of NFTs or other
intangible personal property rights can be, how successful their
socio-technological thingification has been. They are certainly
solid enough to cause buyers to pay $69 million for a jpeg
associated with a cryptographic token, or hundreds of thousands
of dollars for a short clip associated with a slot on a decentralized
ledger. But for these assets to hold value (and in the current
meltdown we must ask whether they will succeed) we must be
able to look at what they are–their thing-ness–and determine
whether the conceptual container of a digital thing is strong
enough to hold the legal rights.
Hohfeldian property was a process of adding informational
characteristics to real and personal property. The development
of NFTs involves adding technologically created physical
characteristics to informational objects. Thing-ness is needed
as a constraint to complexity, as a force for defragmentation,
and as a mold for modularity to help counterbalance the nature
of digital objects and their tendency to fragment and dissipate,
just as Hohfeldian legal rights were needed to add flexibility and
free up value in real and personal property. This essay discusses
thing-ness in the context of digital assets, how simulated
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The history of property online
Technological shifts spur legal shifts. As internet
technologies developed, legal norms shifted rapidly. Some
areas managed the shift to digital technology relatively
seamlessly. Contract shifted to electronic contract with a
minimum of fuss.1 To be sure, the shift in affordances worked
deep changes that have changed the face of contract law
forever. Electronic contracts eventually changed the nature of
contracting from dickered mutual agreement to the EULA.2
But at no point did the new technology prevent contracts from
forming even if the contract took a different form and protected
different interests.
Not so with property. Unlike contracting online, which
was able to survive for the most part, parties have, until
now, not been able to create robust electronic personal
property interests. The dominant paradigm for property online
became intellectual property.3 The fit was not quite right.
Intellectual property did indeed deal with intangibles, but
regular rights in property—easements, possibilities of reverter,
a renter’s right to present possession of a rental car, and so
on—are quite intangible too. The shift online knocked out
almost all rights in personal property, and replaced them with
intellectual property licenses.4 We do not own our fully paidfor eBooks, movies, games, and so on, we merely license
them.5
Property law organizes peoples’ rights with respect to scarce
resources. It is the word scarce that interests us here. Consider
a book. There are personal property interests in the physical
copy, and intellectual property interests in the copyrightable
1

See Noonan (2009) (“Today, transacting electronically has become

the norm rather than the exception. Nearly any type of contract can be
drafted and executed electronically.”).
2

See Fairﬁeld (2009) (describing how End User License Agreements

may present an issue of meaningful consent in contract).
3

See Moringiello (2007) [hereinafter Moringiello, False Categories]

(explaining the “tendency to place new intangible rights into the category
of intellectual property in case law and scholarship”).
4

See Fairﬁeld (2017) [hereinafter Fairﬁeld, Owned] (explaining how the

RAM Copy Doctrine and DMCA 1201 contributed to the treatment of
intangible (digital) property differently than its physical analog, under
intellectual property laws).
5

02

See, e.g., Stone, 2009.
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of digital property are encapsulated in the Napster story.12
Napster enabled individual users to share music files at
near-zero cost and skirt IP protections.13 The response was
to bolster protections for copyrighted material, but this is
only as effective as the capability of its enforcement. It’s too
difficult to enforce the protections against every person with
a computer.
The answer was technologically enforced digital scarcity.
Developers placed a series of locks on users’ personal devices
that are collectively referred to as Digital Rights Management
or DRM.14 DRM programs can prevent you from downloading
a DVD to your computer or converting a YouTube song into
an MP3. As anyone who has ever thought about downloading a
YouTube video knows, those protections can often be defeated
with a simple Google search. Whenever a new DRM control
is created, people with technological expertise set out trying
to defeat it.15 Rather than engaging in a DRM arms race,
those trying to protect copyrighted material lobbied Congress
to make it illegal to break the DRM locks on devices and
to help others break those locks.16 Now, rather than chasing
down every person who has ever converted a YouTube video
to an MP3, companies only need to go after the people making
YouTube to MP3 conversion programs. The average person does
not have the technological know-how to break a DRM lock on
their own, so by preventing people from creating the means of
breaking DRM locks, copyright protectors thought (incorrectly
as it turned out) that they had found the key they needed to
artificially create digital scarcity and protect value online. The
first problem was that DRM proved simply too easy to skirt.
The second was that this means of creating digital scarcity could
only be accessed by a small group of people—large corporations
with thousands of copyrights and billions of dollars to create
DRM controls over their products as they circulate on the
internet. A means of protecting scarcity (and thus value) that
is only available to one group of people means that the value
created by those items is only available to one group of people
as well.
The centralized license server DRM model succeeded
only in imposing constraints on consumers and owners, not
pirates. Online assets are therefore in the first stages of
migrating from the failed traditional centralized commandand-control model to a decentralized model of individual
ownership. The technological change that undergirds this

writing. The book can be kept scarce by limiting the number
of physical objects made. Intellectual property interests limit
the ability of free riders to simply make infinite copies of the
book. This changed online—the limitation of the physical form
gone, anyone could make infinite copies of a work at near
zero cost. The assumption of law was that the physical form of
the copy was gone, and all that remained was the copyright.6
The law sought to recreate scarcity by imposing sanctions on
anyone who made a copy.7 The approach had the unfortunate
side effect of eradicating traditional personal property interests.
That personal property interests are present online is clear,
but only when intellectual property rights do not muddy the
question. Thus, for example, a domain name is considered
personal property.8 As Kremen v. Cohen noted, property extends
to anything susceptible to unique possession.9 Yet until relatively
recently, intellectual property interests and ubiquitous End User
License Agreements obscured nearly all cases of digital personal
property.10
These twin problems of IP overreach and lack of true
digital scarcity so plagued online personal property interests that
they did not make a robust transition to online environments.
The result is now over two decades of studies showing
that digital items and online assets are worth billions of
dollars, yet all of these markets are at best gray because
law has failed to offer a coherent framework for digital
ownership.11

Digital scarcity and value
The mismatch between consumer expectations for
ownership of digital property and what has been made
available in the form of EULA-enabled use of digital property
is the result of decisions—both legal and technological—
made during the early days of the internet. The early fears

6

See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Comput., Inc., (“Peak’s loading of

copyrighted software into RAM creates a “copy” of that software in
violation of the Copyright Act.”).
7

Id.

8

See Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 3, at 148–50 (describing

the conﬂict for intellectual property law to govern ownership of a domain
12

name).
9

See A&M Records, Inc. (explaining how Napster enables copyright

infringement).

Kremen v. Cohen (“Property is a broad concept that includes

every intangible beneﬁt and prerogative susceptible of possession or

13

Id.

disposition.”) (internal quotes omitted).

14

Fairﬁeld, Owned, supra note 4.

10

See Fairﬁeld, Owned, supra note 4, at 45–48 (summarizing the

15

See Perzanowski and Schultz (2016).

intellectual property and online contract regime governing digital

16

See 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (West) (“No person shall circumvent a

property rights).

technological measure that effectively controls access to a work

11

See, e.g., Robertson, 2021.
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shift is the development of blockchain technology, a form
of decentralized database that merges encryption and game
theory to create lists of ownership that do not rely on any
central entity to maintain the list, and are robust against efforts
to falsify the lists.17 The social shift is one in which large
numbers of people have created a social context for value in
digital property.

Things are commonly accepted means for turning social
value into a collectible: consider for example a homerun baseball
or the tickets to a culturally significant concert. Anyone who
has been a collector or watched a collectors’ market has
seen how mundane objects gain value by association with a
socially relevant moment. To carry this freight, things must
be authentic. As will be discussed further down, blockchains,
NFTs, and cryptoledger technology solve the problems of how
to attach value and authenticate objects, items, and experiences.
Addressing these problems allows for social value to be stored
and owned in the digital space in the same way that it is in the
physical space.

Value is social
The value of a thing of course does not reside in that thing
itself, but in the value that social groups attach to it. As a
social group values or demands a thing more, its price rises;
this is the basic mechanism of scarcity and value. There are
different components: a thing must be desirable in some way,
and scarcity exacerbates demand. Increasing value in the face of
scarcity is often less of a mystery than value in the first place. We
understand demand for gasoline, and how the value can rise as
supply becomes scarce more than how a new form of demand
comes into being. Consider the kind of demand sufficient to
support paying thousands of dollars for a GIF of a fun play in
an NBA game, for example.18 It is important not to spend too
much time asking why people value it (one useful exercise for the
reader may be to examine their own hobbies and ask what they
might pay for an object with particular value within that activity,
in order to see how communities generate value), and instead
focus on the mechanisms by which law reduces transaction costs
for satisfying human preferences.
Social value has two components, a community that attaches
value and a nexus to which community value attaches. Social
value alone is not enough: imagine that a community of sports
fans attaches particular importance to a moment in sports
history. That is a shared experience, non-rivalrous, a potential
source of value, but without a mechanism to attach that value.
Tying the moment to an entry in a cryptoledger, and creating
a community that recognizes the owner of the ledger entry as
having some special relationship with the moment takes turning
an experience into a thing.
As an aside, it is worth asking whether privatizing a moment
by creating a collectible is a socially beneficial activity. Why
take something shared and create something that can be owned
by an individual? Yet it is not clear that the existence of band
merchandise reduces the social value of a concert, that a homerun ball reduces the social value of a baseball game, or that a
community of collectors of artifacts from the Alamo reduces the
social significance of the historical moment. Things can serve as
a way of helping those who value an experience to convey value
to the community of interest. Buying artwork is a core way of
supporting art, and so on.
17
18

Property and information theory in
the law of things
This sub-part considers the future of the tension between
Hohfeldian property theory, and the subsequent turn to
information theory, which seeks to limit the extent to
which Hohfeldian disaggregation of property rights raises
transaction costs.

Hohfeldian property and information
theory
Hohfeldian conceptions of property have dominated our
understanding of property interests long before the law began
adapting itself to new digital contexts. Conceptualizing property
as a bundle of sticks helped jurists, scholars, lawyers, and average
users of property understand how different interests can be
bought or sold. It freed legal rights from the constraints of
thing-ness: I can own something even though you possess and
use it, and so on. The Hohfeldian conception of property freed
up property use, but without the boundaries of thing-ness it
can become self-defeating. Property can become fragmented to
the point of uselessness when too many sticks are siphoned
away from the bundle, when ownership is too divided, or
when interests are too informationally complex for buyers to
know what they are getting. Information theory seeks to tie
the interests back together and re-create thing-ness to prevent
property from being fragmented to the point of uselessness.19
A group of theorists and theories (Henry Smith, Tom
Merrill, Christina Mulligan, myself, and others) take what I
term an “informational turn.” Under this view, thing-ness in
property law limits fragmentation of property rights, exerts
a gravitational pull on titles that are more marketable, and
works to eliminate invisible interests that raise search costs.20
While property enables fractional and divided ownership by,

See Fairﬁeld (2015) [hereinafter Fairﬁeld, Bitproperty].

19

(Beer, 2021).

Numerus Clausus].
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say, allowing parties to move sticks like servitudes, easements,
and the like from one holder to another, there are any number
of doctrines that reinforce that the contours of the legal right
should match the contours of the thing, and limit rights to the
extent that they complicate the use or marketability of the thing,
whether the thing be a diamond, a farm, a factory, or an NFT.
Property is the discipline of determining rights between
humans with respect to scarce resources. The law is primarily
concerned with conveying information about who may do what
with which resources. A primary goal is ensuring that the
rights pass smoothly in the stream of commerce. The most
important person in property law is the uninvolved third party—
an interested buyer, seller, potential trespasser, or the like—
someone who does not know the lay of the land, does not know
about any hidden deals made between prior owners of the land
and any other parties.
The problem is that Hohfeldian sticks, when removed
from the bundle, complicate the informational characteristics
of the property. To enable Hohfeldian disaggregation of the
bundle of sticks, to enable things like easements, databases
become necessary technology. Expensive and often inaccurate
title searches are necessary because, with property, what you
see is not what you get. The use characteristics of the
property are not immediately available to third parties who
may wish to purchase, rent, or even simply take a hike on
the property.

The problem that Merrill, Smith, and others have proposed
is that each variation from the default form of fee simple
ownership increases search costs.23 The basic concept is easy
enough to see: imagine that the only form of property ownership
is fee simple absolute. One would not have to incur search costs
in order to find out what rights came with the property. The
answer would be simple: all sticks in the bundle reside with the
owner. Indeed, in that scenario there would be no need for the
bundle of sticks metaphor, because property ownership would
not be decomposable.
There is an informational price to be paid for bespoke
property forms. Everyone who has purchased a house has felt
this cost, as they have either paid for it in money—by procuring
a title search or paying for title insurance—or in time, as they
have pored over plats attempting to understand easements and
servitudes and the impact they have on the property. And to
keep our eye on the ball: that search cost is particularly high
in the sale of high-value intangible personal property interests,
where a code audit of the smart contract and legal analysis
of intellectual property licensing agreements will be at a bare
minimum necessary to determine what exactly an investor or
collector has bought.
Merrill and Smith offer the central example of a bicycle.
What if we could sell off (not contract out of, but actually sell the
Hohfeldian stick out of the bundle) the right to use the bicycle on
Tuesday mornings?24 If that were the case, the legal damage done
by the prying of a stick out of the bundle of rights would not be
apparent on the surface of the bicycle, and yet the damage would
certainly be done. The bicycle would be worth less with the right
sold off, but that is the lesser problem. If people have the ability
to sell off such rights in their bicycles, all bicycles would cost
more to acquire, since prospective owners must now search for
and ensure that they do not run afoul of a right that has already
been sold off.
Merrill and Smith’s key example is drawn from personal
property, and with good reason—we do not have formal
methods for owning personal property with easements and
servitudes. Fee simple absolute is in fact the norm for personal
property, and possession is usually deemed synonymous with

The numerus clausus and search costs
To respond to needs created by Hohfeldian property
interests, information theorists have identified at least four ways
in which property law acts to limit the impact of splitting up
rights in things, especially when splitting up rights in things
impedes the free flow of the asset in the stream of commerce
or impedes the use of the thing. The first is the idea of
the numerus clausus, a civil law term that describes property
law’s reluctance to countenance new forms of ownership.21
Closing the number of property forms limits the range of
information costs. Since Hohfeldian property rights are invisible
on the face of the property, the theory goes, they must be
kept few in number, clearly described, and must be written
in the database in order to be enforced against third parties
who otherwise have no way of knowing from the face of the
property what sticks have been taken out of the bundle of fee
simple ownership.22

22

See id. at 1694 n.8 (“It is worth noting that strategies for managing

rights to use open-access resources tend also to rely on simple, easily
known rules, which also economize on information costs.”).
23

See e.g., id. at 1706 (“In rem rights are directed at a wide and

indeﬁnite audience of duty holders and other affected parties, who would
incur high information costs in dealing with idiosyncratic property rights

20

See id.; Smith (2012) [hereinafter Smith, Property As the Law of

and would have to process more types of information than they would in

Things]; Merrill and Smith (2001).

the absence of the numerus clausus.”).

21

24

See Smith, Property As the Law of Things, supra note 20 at 1698

See Merrill and Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 19 at 27

(“[The] principle that property forms come in a ﬁnite and closed menu.”).

(explaining that sales of “time-shares” of a property can only be done

Cite numerus clausus article.

through contract and no such interest in property can be transferred).
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ownership: there is (rather, there was) no record of personal
property ownership because there didn’t need to be.
Particularly in the realm of personal property, thing-ness and
the possession of things carry enormous informational freight.
Possession of a thing conveys information because the thing is
rivalrous, because it is an integrated whole, the wheels come
with the car, the right to use the car comes with it as well.
A thing in the law of property is what Latour calls a quasiobject. Like a brick (given its shape by physics and culture),
a thing is an amalgam of understandings about the extent of
resources conveyed with the thing, the rights conveyed with the
thing, a mixture of material affordance and social permission.25
Consider the act of buying a washing machine at a yard sale.
There is no record of ownership, there is no fragmentation of
the rights in the machine, one expects to simply buy the machine
and have all rights in it, to be done with the matter. The allimportant information conveyed to the buyer is that they may
buy a set of resources and rights, all packaged modularly, to flow
in the stream of commerce, in the form of ownership of the
thing. Thing-ness carries all of that information in the webwork
of understanding humans have worked out with each other.26

law has a series of built-in systems that continually work to
align the Hohfeldian interests with actual asset. To provide just
one example, consider how the law of adverse possession aligns
record title ownership with the actual on-the-ground use and
possession of property.
Property is information, whether written in a ledger
or written on the landscape.29 Where ownership interests
diverge from what is plainly visible, databases fill the gap.
Where the database written on the landscape diverge from
the informational databases, we reconcile the two.30 Given,
then, that property is so heavily involved with information,
it is perhaps superficially surprising that its transition to fully
informational (i.e., virtual) environments has been so fraught.

Modularity
A third component of thing-ness with respect to information
is modularity. Consider a car muffler. The capabilities of the
muffler could have been engineered into the car itself.31 (The
opposite is often also true: status “performance” vehicles and
electric cars sometimes have noise generators so that people
can hear the car coming.) The point, though, is that certain
components, like mufflers, oil filters, alternators, and so on, are
designed to be modular, to be easily swappable.
Thing-ness in this respect is a matter of constraining the
inputs and outputs of a module. Modules contain complexity.
The inside of a swappable component can be as complex as
one wants, as long as the interface with the rest of the system
is managed by a simple plug. If anyone has installed RAM
into a computer, they get the point. The RAM sticks are the
result of tremendous innovation in the number of circuits
contained in a chip, they are absurdly internally complex.
That complexity needs to be swappable, however, and so the
thing, the stick of RAM, has a clean plug that allows it to
interface with the rest of the system. Thing-ness helps systems
become interoperable and interchangeable. The thing is the unit
of complexity that is low-cost to swap.32 Thing-ness in this
regard makes systems marketable, dis-assemblable, repairable,
and upgradeable.33 When one thing can be swapped out without

Defragmentation
Thing-ness also addresses the Hohfeldian problem of
fragmentation by defragmenting property so that it is compiled
into a single thing. Imagine a tractor. It would make little sense
to carve up ownership of a tractor in such a way that one person
would own the steering wheel, another the engine, the third the
wheels. For a more concrete analogy, consider the difficulty of
land that, through descent and distribution, comes to be owned
by many people. The use of such land becomes complicated. The
law assumes that co-tenants each have total rights over co-owned
property, but the practicality is that land subject to fragmented
property interests is worth less, is harder to sell, and is harder to
use, because of the multiplicity of overlapping interests.27
The point of property is the ownership and use of something.
Thing-ness, the idea that the bundle of rights relates to some
core conceptual object, returns Hohfeldian sticks to the original
bundle unless stringent formalities of notice are met. It provides
an out, restoring co-owned property to single title ownership
through partition by sale, and so on.28 Put another way, the

28

Id.

29

See Merrill and Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 19 at 40–

42 (describing how property conceptualized in terms of the cost of
25

SeeLatour (1993) (“Quasi-objects are in between and below the two

maintaining and searching property ownership interests is useful).

poles [of nature and society], at the very place around which dualism and

30

dialectics had turned endlessly without being able to come to terms with

is, recording acts. This device lowers the costs of notice; it is an alternative

them. Quasi-objects are much more social, much more fabricated, much

method of lowering information costs.”).

more collective than the “hard” parts of nature, but they are in no way the

31

arbitrary receptacles of a full-ﬂedged society.”).

(2012) (analyzing “thing-ness” and the modular conception of “things” in

26

See Geertz (1973) ([M]an is an animal suspended in webs of

See Davidson (2008) (explaining the value of numerus clausus).
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See id. (“Consider the rise of registers of interests in real property, that
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Id.

33

Id.
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compromising other elements or parts of a system, it creates
not only a market for the sub-level things themselves, but
improves the value of things comprised of other things. Consider
the market for cars, where the availability of parts and ease
of repairability are significant components to the value of the
car. A car that cannot be repaired, for which repairs involve
work on complex, interconnected systems, lowers the value
of the whole. Cars with widely available, easily swappable
components are easier to repair and easier to upgrade. There
are developed and competitive markets for the parts, which are
each swappable. Making something integrated is a means of
preventing competition on that component—consider how hard
Microsoft labored to leverage its computer operating system
monopoly into a monopoly on browser content: an attempt
that failed despite Microsoft’s integration of its inferior Explorer
browser into every operating system because of the inherent
modularity of software. Other options, Chrome, Firefox, etc.,
were easy to download and install. The worst features of software
are often made integral, impossible to lever out, while superior
products are made to be modular, useful in a wide range of
contexts without compromising the surrounding systems or the
integrity of the whole.

reflects its (relative, often manufactured) scarcity. If an asset
is truly non-excludable or non-rival and there are no effective
access controls, then no-one will pay for it: it is available for
free. An example might be—under normal circumstances—air
and oxygen. But, like water (consider Evian or Fiji) assets may
become valuable if they become scarce or artificial scarcity is
imposed by imposing effective access controls.
Natural, physical excludability is the way the physical
characteristics of things became informational: things, because
of the natural costs of making more of them, carry the freight
of the system of value by which creators (and unfortunately
middlemen) are compensated. As each person buys a record, a
copy of a book, a CD or copy of a movie, the creator is remitted
royalties, for example. If copies are free—as in rampant digital
piracy—then this value chain breaks down. The value of the
goods is zero if they are truly non-excludable or non-rival: the
Nash equilibrium for price goes to zero when creators are forced
to compete against entities that can provide copies at zero cost.
As noted elsewhere, intellectual property extended and
evolved to increase access controls, both to create the artificial
scarcity needed to produce the kind of value delivery system
thing-ness naturally provides. This attempt to create artificial
scarcity by defending technological locks by law revealed
its own Achilles heel: technological protection measures that
rely on the protection of law are not much in the way of
technological protection measures. Indeed, the history of such
measures has been one of abysmal failure—copy protection
measures are circumvented by hackers within weeks of being
deployed. The lasting legacy of this ill-fated arms race between
technological protection measures and hackers was only to
increase IP rightsholders’ control over users’ rights beyond any
consideration of the copyright.
All of which to say, technological means to create
rivalry, scarcity, and uniqueness have been crucial goals of
digital markets.

Excludability and rivalrousness
The key feature of physical personal property is that it
is excludable. If I have the ball, you do not. If I throw you
the ball, you have it and I do not. Such an asset may also
be rivalrous: if I consume it, that may reduce the amount of
it there is for you to consume. Excludability has a strange
half-defined relationship with scarcity. If there is a scarcity of
balls, the physical excludability of the ball matters. If it does
not, then excludability or rivalry may exist, but do not matter.
Excludability and rivalry drive related concepts of uniqueness—
an idea cannot be unique, since everyone can share it, and
consuming it does not reduce the amount of the idea available
to others—and scarcity, which have two significant inputs into
the production and sale of excludable or rivalrous personal
property.34 First, if an asset is not excludable or rivalrous, the
marginal cost of production is usually quite low—it takes little to
no cost to duplicate an idea or an MP3.35 This is Posner’s wellestablished differentiation between personal and intellectual
property. Personal property costs more or less the same for each
marginal unit produced (with economies of scale, to be sure).
The second is that the price for an excludable or rivalrous item
34

Re-creating thing-ness in NFTs
Where Hohfeldian property conceptions worked to attach
informational characteristics to physical property, the task for
NFTs is to create simulated physical characteristics (excludability
or rivalry chief among them) for pieces of property that
are entirely comprised of information. Thing-ness, as it was
useful in constraining informational complexity in property, will
be equally useful in attempting to bond together the diffuse
interests related to digital ownership.
Beginning with excludability, distributed ledgers—
blockchains and the like—have sought to recreate certain
characteristics of “thing-ness.” This allows the creators of these
objects to tap into the intuitions around property, the set of
widely installed social instructions that says that you are allowed
to ride a bicycle you purchase, but not through someone else’s

See Fairﬁeld, Bitproperty, supra note 17 at 839 (“Traditional property,

a system designed through a long tradition of common law deliberation
to govern interests in scarce and rival resources, did not seem at the time
of the rise of the Internet to be immediately applicable to an environment
in which many resources were neither scarce nor rival.”).
35

Id.
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living room. It allows sellers to capture the value associated
with ownership, that loosely negotiated but highly prized set
of social permissions around the use of scarce resources.36
With “thing-ness,” creators can get an item’s sale price rather
than its rental price. They can tap into the premium paid by
people who want control of and access to a resource without
interference from others, or those who wish to use ownership as
an associational channel—if I own the Hope Diamond, I have
acquired a certain je ne sais quoi.
As informational objects, NFTs of course can best be
understood by attending to informational flows and forms. As I
detail below, however, the informational characteristics of things
are imperfectly recreated when the resources in play are nonphysical. I do not mean that the features of thing-ness cannot be
recreated. Much of what makes a thing a thing in property is the
conveyance of rights that are a function of social agreement, not
physics. NFT creators have invoked powerful intuitions around
thing-ness and ownership. Yet they do not presently deliver on
those features. This is because the legal framework that underlies
NFTs details a different set of social expectations and affordances
than one receives as the owner of personal property.37 Many
NFT owners are surprised to learn how little they truly own. The
following sub-parts pick apart our attempts to re-create thingness in information environments, and apply the information
theory of property to the resulting digital quasi-objects, to see
how they stack up.

landscape, where owners merely license rather than own even
fully paid-for digital assets. This copying problem ensured that
copy-rights became the dominant legal regime, as industrysponsored laws strengthened and extended license rights and
increased penalties for helping owners make full use of their
own purchases.
Copying was the same core problem in the attempt to solve
a slightly different problem, that of creating a fully decentralized
digital currency. Centralized currencies were not particularly
difficult, requiring only a trusted entity to maintain a ledger
and authenticate transactions. That raised two problems in turn:
first, that the authenticator might not be trustworthy, or second,
that the central ledger might be compromised by bad actors.
In either case, the problem became the same as that of the
intellectual property rights organizations: copying. The risk was
that a bad actor might duplicate currency, commonly called the
“double spending problem.” An actor might spend money, then
rewrite the ledger, and spend it again, a modern version of check
fraud by bouncing checks.
The solution was a combination of cryptography and game
theory. Mathematical relationships tied entries into a database
to one another, such that altering the past would alter the
present—everyone would know that the database had been
faked. Making that database and those linked entries is costly
in terms of processing power (and energy, which makes the
technology wildly damaging to the environment). The game
theory component consisted of the fact that the only way to fake
the database (and thus double-spend by rewriting the database
to indicate that the spender had their money back) was to
expend so many resources that it would be far more profitable
to contribute to the main database than to hack it.
The result was a database of linked entries. If Person A sent
Bitcoin 1 to Person B, and then later attempted to rewrite the
common database to claw the bitcoin back, the effort would
either prove futile, or, if enough processor cycles and energy were
expended to functionally recreate the database, the database
would come into question, destroying the value of all entries and
therefore denying the fraudster of their prize.
The resulting digital assets were therefore excludable, and if
consumed, rivalrous. If Person A transferred a bitcoin to Person
B, the decentralized cryptoledger would register the transfer, and
rewriting the history of the transaction was not feasible. In this
way, the ledger digitally mimicked the excludable characteristic
of physical personal property. The tokens were, however, largely
fungible. Each bitcoin—or ether, or dogecoin, or whatever the
cryptocurrency happened to be—was worth as much as any
other. They were like quarters—scarce, valuable, but each much
like any other, interchangeable.
Yet the analogy to quarters holds in one other respect.
Some coins are collectible because of other facts or attributes,
years, materials, history, and the like. They take on the
characteristics of uniqueness. Even among bitcoin, these
secondary characteristics offered a kind of differentiation if not

Nature of the non-fungible thing
A full treatment of cryptoledgers and cryptocurrency is
beyond the scope of this short essay. For purposes of the
discussion of how property—and particularly information
theories of property—might serve as the law of virtual things,
a few basic points are worth stressing.
The major problem for digital property was excludability—
how to solve the online zero-cost copying problem. As noted
above, the key distinction lies in marginal costs of production.
A physical house costs as much to build the second time as
it did the first. A virtual home is duplicated at the click of
a button. Given that virtual assets are—without more—often
duplicatable for near-zero cost, the law of intellectual property
was given free rein online. For example, the ability to infinitely
duplicate movies and music at no cost—a basic feature of the
internet—was treated as an existential challenge by various
industry associations who profited from artists and consumers
alike by dominating distribution channels. Under their lobbying
and control, intellectual property licenses created the current
36

See Smith, Property As the Law of Things, supra note 20.
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See Fairﬁeld (2021) [hereinafter Fairﬁeld, Tokenized] (“The creator of

the system has signiﬁcant control over the [NFT] because they are able to
ban or control access to the service or site in which the asset is used.”).
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of collection (since anyone who had access to the game could
screen grab and make a.jpg of the same shot, steal, or freethrow), is that the “Moment” is associated with an NFT, a
cryptographically unique token, an entry in a smart contract
stating that buyer B owns Moment 1. The intellectual property
license and the personal property interest in the token are in
many cases only loosely associated. Usually the token contains
a database entry of a url pointing to the .jpg, which is hosted on
servers. Or, perhaps, the token contains a hash of the entire short
film segment, a number generated by running all of the pixels
of the.jpg through a mathematical function that creates a unique
math string of limited length. That string, embedded in the list of
features that make the token unique and recorded by the smart
contract, proves that the token is associated precisely with—
and only with—the original .jpg. It’s a virtual staple, linking
intellectual property to digital property, much like a link links
one web page with another.
This look under the NFT hood cues up the questions raised
in the following sub-parts, in which we analyze how the various
questions of information theory are addressed, ignored, or
actively swept under the rug. What role does virtual “thing-ness”
play? How good of a simulacrum are NFT creators and buyers
working with?
In each of the following sub-parts, the arguments track
a general trend. Intuitions about property, combined with
the informational elements of thing-ness, combine to provide
an informational backdrop, traditions about what an owner
may do with scarce resources. To the extent that a property
scheme draws on established traditions, it conserves information
costs. For example: It would be an odd property system that
would not allow an owner to make use of their property.
Some use restrictions therefore catch owners by surprise—
particularly those that are the result of private dealmaking (a
negative easement, for example) rather than public deliberation
(i.e., zoning). To the extent that the bundle of rights and
technological features meet buyers’ expectations, the law of
property for virtual things will make purchasing and using
NFTs easier simply by meeting expectations. Yet, as we will
see below, the artificial thing-ness of NFTs works out in some
different ways as compared to physical thing-ness, and the legal
regime surrounding intellectual property has so long ruled the
digital asset space that the intuitions of personal property no
longer obtain.

uniqueness. For example, since every transaction of a coin is
recorded as a transfer from one account to another recorded in a
decentralized ledger, the entire transactional history of a unit is a
matter of record. So, drug dealers prefer newly minted coins with
no history, rather than coins that have a long and tainted history.
From these forms of differentiation, of quasi-uniqueness,
then, the two problems merged. The problem of copying of
digital assets could be solved with blockchain technology if
the ledger were capable of recording tokens that had unique
characteristics. A unique copy of an MP3, or a unique copy of
anything else, for that matter, could be represented by an entry
in a database, secured by cryptography and game theory against
third party interference and with no need for an intermediary.
Of course, it would be inefficient to create an entire blockchain
for each type of unique digital asset needed (one for comic
books, one for digital art, one for items in a virtual game,
one for collectors’ editions of albums, and so on). Among
other things, such a design would mean that each blockchain
would be less secure, since less work—processor cycles—would
be dedicated to securing the database. However, a blockchain
is programmable because it remembers state, which means
blockchains can themselves serve as the foundation for software
that runs on the distributed database. And that software can
be other databases, much like Google Drive runs on Google’s
own databases—virtual machines—that in turn run on hardware
machines. In the same way, a database listing unique tokens,
virtual deeds that are as different from one another as Park
Place and Mediterranean Avenue are in Monopoly, can be
programmed to use the original blockchain, usually Ethereum,
as a foundation, using a protocol called ERC-20 (an earlier
version) or ERC-721 (and more protocols are forthcoming as
community members proposed different formats).
Non-fungible tokens are database entries, written to a smart
contract, which is a database itself, along with a number of rules
for moving and identifying tokens. The smart contract lists the
number of tokens issued, and the accounts to whom those tokens
are assigned as entries in the contract, and sometimes rules for
transfer or other features of the pool of tokens. The contract can
specify certain rules on transfer—like remitting a percentage of
the value of a sale back to the token’s original creator—or other
special rules that are not at all apparent to the purchaser without
delving into the specifics of the smart contract.
Non-fungible tokens often do not represent value merely
by themselves. A bitcoin is valuable purely because the entry
in the bitcoin blockchain is valuable—humans want them and
are willing to trade value for them. Nothing more is required.
But many NFTs represent unique assets, or seek to make assets
unique by metaphorically stapling a unique entry in a smart
contract, a token, to an otherwise easily copyable intellectual
property asset. Take, for example, Top Shot, a licensed digital
collectible marketplace, which is run by the NBA. People
purchase “Moments,” a.jpg of a few seconds worth of dramatic
gameplay. What makes the “Moment” unique—and thus worthy

Frontiers in Research Metrics and Analytics

Excludability, scarcity, and uniqueness in
NFTs
Excludability, scarcity, and uniqueness are the strong suits of
NFT frameworks. The tokens are mathematically and provably
unique, the cryptography used in the blockchain structure
ensures that each token is what it appears to be, and the
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combination of proof systems (proof of work being still the lead
example) with game theory ensures that transfers do not result
in double spending.
Yet there are components to the excludability and
rivalrousness discussion that are not entirely resolved through
NFTs. Virtual thing-ness may have successfully invoked the
human urge to collect, but it has not resolved the human urge
to copy.38 Take, for example, the celebrated $69 million NFT
minted based on several years’ worth of daily artwork by the
artist Beeple.39 Would you like to see what it looked like? A
simple Google search will work. Would you like to have your
own copy? Right-clicking and saving the file will work. The
same is true for depictions of the Mona Lisa: take a picture
with your smartphone and you have your very own, and yet
there are important differences. NFTs do not—directly—solve
the copy protection problem. If a book is distributed with an
NFT for each copy of the book, pirates who do not wish to
pay for the book may still download it quite successfully. Some
technological solutions to that problem may exist such as license
servers.40
There are knock-on effects as well. Excludability bears on the
eponymous Hohfeldian right to exclude, commonly theorized
to be the most important of the property bundle of sticks. If I
cannot keep someone else from accessing or using an asset, it
is not functionally excludable or rival: forced sharing precludes
excludability. One common way of expressing the right to
destroy is as an extreme example of the right to exclude—the
owner excludes everyone from the asset, including herself.41
Here, the nature of an NFT causes a split in the ability to
exercise strong rights to exclude, including the right to destroy.
A cryptographic token is of course easy to destroy in a manner
of speaking. A transfer of a token to an account that does not
exist means that the token can never be transferred again. This
is termed “burning” the token, and is an integral part of some
blockchains, which need a way of “destroying” database entries
that are permanently and indelibly written to a public database.
But the dual nature of many NFTs—half token, half
intellectual property—make exclusion or its ultimate

38

extension—destruction—more complex. Consider an art-linked
NFT. The token can be burned, but the intellectual property
linked to it almost certainly won’t be. Most tokens merely link
to the IP file, which is hosted generally on some third-party
server.42 A hash of the NFT and its URL link the token to the IP,
but burning the token would in the overwhelming majority of
cases not serve to destroy the intellectual property component
of the NFT.
Again, there are workarounds, and again one might
reasonably ask why a user would expect to be able to destroy
something she owns. To the second question, destruction is a
powerful statement—ask Banksy43 —and anyway, the point is
only that NFTs do not permit exclusion from an owned resource,
merely a claim of association or affiliation by the owner. And to
the first point, were NFT creators to decide to create versions of
NFTs that act more like physical personal property, to give them
the “thing-ness” characteristic of exclusion or destructibility,
they could do so. Imagine an art NFT that was itself encrypted,
and must be decrypted by the owner in order to view or use. If
the decryption key to encrypted art were burned, and if there
were no other decrypted copies of the file, then the piece would
be effectively destroyed.
Although we have been discussing destruction here in order
to explore how NFTs work differently than physical things
for purposes of the Hohfeldian exclusion right, the limits on
NFT exclusion apply in much less extreme cases. Consider, for
example, that there is nothing that limits an IP rightsholder from
minting another NFT connected to the same artwork, or indeed
minting many such.44 The effect would be as though a baseball
card company suddenly printed many more of a rare series,
leading collectors to either be forced to differentiate between
first and later created cards, or watch the value of the original
plummet with each additional piece made available. Perhaps the
age of a token will stand in for the collector’s avid desire to
own a black-border Black Lotus Magic the Gathering card, a
phenomenon by which thing-ness and time combine to generate
scarcity and value. But that will be a social process, one in which
certain serial numbers or minting dates will grant and hold value
for the NFT. It remains to be seen whether the communities
that generate social value of affiliation will choose to map the
technological features to social status. If they do not, then even
the NFT owner’s claim to exclusive affiliation with a piece of art
or other tokenized asset will be fragile and difficult to value.

A recent example of item duplication in the popular open-world

game, Valheim, exempliﬁes how people still have an interest in “duping”
virtual items whenever they ﬁnd the chance. See Zimbler, 2021.
39

See (Kastrenakes, 2021) (reporting on the record-breaking NFT sale).
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See Software License Server (“To keep track of the licenses and users,

the license server uses a centralized computer software system that gives
access tokens—also known as software license keys—that allow licensed
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software to run on a client’s computer. No token—no access.”).

third-party server).

See Finzer (describing how NFT art is most often stored on a

Strahilevitz (2005) (“The right to destroy property is, after all, often
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See Reyburn, 2018.

an extreme exercise of some of the more widely recognized sticks in the
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bundle of rights. The right to destroy is an extreme version of the right to

of a high-selling GIF after a user purchases the original copy. See Terms

exclude; by destroying a vase, I permanently exclude third parties from

of Use (2022) (explaining that the user owns the token and the company
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Numerus clausus, fragmentation, and
search costs

These hidden informational costs are the exact problem that
Smith and Merrill seek to address with the numerus clausus.48
The legal rights attached to an NFT token are unclear at
best (particularly as regards intellectual property rights). Some
of the features of the NFT are included in the smart contract
that generated the token, not in the token / IP bundle that makes
up the NFT. Some features are not immediately apparent, and
there is no easy way to determine the characteristics of an NFT
from the perspective of a surface-level buyer, someone who is
simply bidding on a piece of online art, for example. There
is no standard form for an NFT, nor a standard set of rights
that attach to purchasing a token, either technological or legal.
In short, NFTs impose significantly higher search costs on the
buyer than would the current set of legal and informational
features attached to a physical piece of personal property.49
To be clear, with standardization, these search costs may fall,
and if a standard set of features and rights emerges from the
current morass of different forms, the market may converge on
a favored form. But it will take many rounds of standardization,
and certainly a standard set of assumptions set by law to create
a virtual numerus clausus. Until then, the costs of ascertaining
exactly what one is buying when one buys an NFT remain
quite high.

Consider the impact of the current technological and
legal landscape on search costs and the informational costs
posited by Smith, Merrill, and others. Simply put, what does
an investor or buyer of NFTs get when they buy? What
are the costs of finding out? The simple answer is that
nobody has the vaguest idea because of several distinct features
of the NTFs themselves (in particular the tension between
intellectual property licenses and personal property interests),
the movement toward fractionalization of interests in NFTs, and
coded governance rules in the smartcontracts that govern both
NFTs and govern fractional interests. This section examines each
problem in turn.

Numerus clausus
The initial problem is that the number of property forms
in NFTs is not limited. EC-20 and EC-721 each permit quite
different characteristics to be assigned to NFTs. A purchaser
of an NFT has very little idea of what she is receiving. It is
as if each NFT were its own form of property, with not only
its own physical or aesthetic features, but with its own legal
characteristics.45 Some NFTs will kick back a portion of their sale
price each time they are sold.46 Some have a built-in capacity to
be frozen from further sale by their creator.47 And so on. Thus,
to begin with, the differences between different forms of NFTs
create and exacerbate search costs for potential purchasers.
There is a stark informational line for physical things
between physical attributes, which are visible, and legal
attributes—information attached by law or documentation to
the thing—which are not. Those are the ones that raise search
costs. The line is fuzzier for NFTs. All of an NFT’s features are
informational in some sense or other. Some are public facing,
for example, a gif or jpeg that constitutes the NFT in popular
understanding. Those elements are highly visible. My drawing
of a cat will not demand the same price as Beeple’s Everydays: the
First 5,000 Days, and buyers will easily be able to respond to the
difference in those aesthetic characteristics because the picture is
out in front, so to speak. But other characteristics of the NFT will
require more effort to uncover, for example, whether the NFT
imposes a royalty payment or percentage kickback on resale.

Fragmentation
Rights in NFTs are deeply fragmented. A buyer of an NFT
does not have clear rights to use, modify, destroy, or even
sell what she bought. After all, most NFTs purport to carry
some interest in intellectual property alongside the NFT, the
intellectual property is an important part of the NFT valuation
(consider again the $69-million-dollar digital-art NFT sold by
Beeple), and yet the licenses for such art are usually deeply
restrictive, imposing limits on the buyer that no collector of
personal property would stand.50
IP rights layered with personal property rights pose a
traditional fragmentation problem. NFTs have two other layered
problems of fragmentation. The first has to do with fractional
ownership of the NFT. Imagine owning an expensive collectible,
the equivalent of an internet Mona Lisa. The promise of NFT
fractionalization is based on infinite divisibility. Physical things
have a fuzzy lower bound to fractionalization: ownership of a
small part of a physical object is at some point mere ownership
of a monetary interest, rather than any interest in the object
itself. Owning half of a hammer, or entering into a co-tenancy
ownership arrangement for a farm makes some sense: there is
48

45

For an exploration of the different forms of NFTs, see Fairﬁeld,
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(discussing different costs that result from too many property forms).
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not only the monetary interest in the half part of the object or
real estate, but that ownership interest also carries use of the
thing. At some point, however, ownership interests become too
small to convey any practical non-financial use of the thing.
Consider a house with 10,000 owners: the co-tenancy cannot
possibly be useful, it must purely be financial. And given that
the practical ability to use a thing disappears as large number of
fractional owners enter play, the value of the asset itself declines
by the amount of its use. It cannot be used, merely traded, and
that is a loss.
These issues have complex relationships to the new class
of digital things. For example, were the IP licenses so worded,
each owner of the digital thing might be permitted to use
the licensed work: each fractional owner of the internet
Mona Lisa could put her likeness on their social media
page, or what have you. Social media use is a bit of a
specious example, but recall that the point of ownership
is most often to associate oneself with the good in some
unique fashion. And there lies the rub. Leveraging the nonphysicality of NFTs to turn fractional interests into full use
rights—everyone can have and be associated with their own
copy of Beeple’s Everydays: the First 5,000 Days, and a
piece of internet history as long as they own a fraction of
the NFT—dilutes exactly the uniqueness that NFTs created.
Fractionalized ownership either undoes the careful work of
creating excludability or rivalrousness (everyone can own a
minute fraction of an NFT that conveys full use rights and
association) or it does not (fractionalized ownership rights
merely convey a financial interest in the NFT). Neither
outcome works.
More, assuming the latter and more likely outcome,
that NFTs retain their excludable characteristics despite
everyone being able to own a miniscule piece of them,
fractionalized ownership will raise search and related
information transaction costs. Imagine the shift from the
problems listed by Smith, Merrill, and others—a piece of
property burdened with cross-cutting property interests,
freezing the asset in the stream of commerce—and multiply
the problem many times over. The first problem is the sheer
number of owners. A house co-owned by another person,
or burdened with a single easement is one matter. An asset
burdened by tens of thousands of crosscutting rights is another
matter entirely.
NFT creators and sellers are not unaware of the problem.
Companies like Fractional seek to provide not only a means
of fractionalizing tokens by minting more tokens to represent
fractional interests in the first token (and there is nothing
to stop one from fractionalizing the fractionalized tokens, it’s
turtles all the way down), but also to provide governance
rules for fractional interest purchasers. After all, if one is
putting a few dollars in to invest into ownership of a very
expensive NFT, the primary interest is financial, and the
fractional interest holders will very much want to be heard
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on whether, when, and under what terms the NFT would be
sold. These governance rules, though, have some very strange
characteristics themselves. First, they are only internal to any
one fractionalization scheme. So, say that a co-owner of interests
in a token decided to fractionalize her 50% interest in an
NFT using Fractional. Assuming that Fractional is serious
about developing governance rules, particularly as relate to
sales of the interests, that half-interest could be governed by
the Fractional rules. Imagine another (hypothetical) company,
Part.ly, that has the same business model of Fractional, but
slightly different governance rules. Part.ly fractions would
govern the other fractionalized interests. In principle, there
is no limit to the different governance regimes that could
rule internal determinations of what is to be done with a
valuable NFT.

Modularity
The last function of thing-ness identified by property
theorists following the informational turn is that thing-ness
encapsulates complexity. Consider a printer cartridge: easily
swappable, but if opened, the module contains considerable
complexity. Note that we call a cartridge a cartridge without
decomposing it into ink and ribbon and so on: the thing is the
physical boundary of plastic that binds all of the components
together, and makes it easily modular with the rest of the system.
The question is to what degree and in what context
do the efforts at virtual thing-ness encapsulate complexity
and permit modularity? Interoperability and modularity in
blockchain applications work in a number of ways. Consider
Ethereum. The blockchain both serves as currency for running
programs on the blockchain’s virtual machine, and as the virtual
machine itself. NFTs are often purchased with ether, and the
smart contracts that determine who owns which NFT are
often themselves programs riding on the Ethereum blockchain.
Tokens that are swappable for ether therefore have both the
modularity of a single blockchain and the exchangeability of a
common currency.
However, modularity in tokens raises new questions of
complexity. NFTs are of course simulated things, not physical
things. Portability is a real issue. Whereas a hammer purchased
in a hardware store can be taken to any job site, tokens are not
free of the nested context in which they are generated. A token
is, after all, only an entry in a smart contract ledger pointing to a
given account as the owner. The token is not exportable outside
of the list that gives it meaning; it is as if the hammer can never
be truly taken out of the store.
Similarly, NFTs are not fully portable outside of the userfacing context in which many are situated. Consider an NFT
of a card in a collectible card trading game—Gods Unchained,
for example. The card only has meaning when played within
the playing environment created by the minter of the card. The
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graphics only display, the card attributes only take effect, the
game only goes on within the environment provided by the
card creator.
There are some attempts to create modularity and portability
for NFTs. The drafters of the Nifty License that governed
Cryptokitties, an early breaking NFT application, opened the
license rights in the IP (the pictures of the cryptokitties
themselves) to permit cryptokitties to be used in other contexts.
Thus, for example, if a third party created a game in which
cryptokitties could race one another, the IP license would
contain a limited carveout for purposes of portability.
Because NFTs are informational objects, they are more
dependent on information environments (wallets for tokens,
environments for game elements, virtual museums for art
collections and the like) to give them life. Pure art NFTs
are somewhat more portable than other instances, because
they can (one supposes, although the licenses generally do
not confirm) display them in an electronic environment of
the owner’s choosing, from Twitter to museums in Flatland.
What is clear, however, is that the element of physicality
that makes a hammer fully portable to new environments—
physics is in this sense a set of mutually operable rules
that work regardless of environment—works out differently
in the NFT context. Portability and interoperability are a
problem because of these external dependencies on things
beyond the NFT itself. And the NFT may not encapsulate
internal complexity well either. The token may not contain
certain idiosyncrasies or features: they may be listed in
the smart-contract that generated it. Thus, NFTs lack a
surface, a natural thing-ness, that ensures that they operate
as a unit, that they encapsulate all necessary elements
for function.

property theorists of the informational turn have noted for
physical property.
The above critique should in no way be taken as a lack of
confidence about the future of NFTs: true digital uniqueness
has long been a holy grail, and even without strong protections,
gray markets in virtual property have thrived for decades.
Rather, by understanding how attempts at thing-ness have not
quite achieved their goals, we can see what is yet to be done.
Intellectual property must take a backseat to personal property
interests, so that buyers may use and display their purchases.
Increased standardization in the forms of NFTs are necessary to
lower search costs and increase buyers’ understanding of what
they have purchased. Personal property rights over NFTs are and
must continue to be recognized by courts, to allow buyers to rely
on their broad understanding of the set of things they may do
with their property. And creators who wish to increase the value
of their offerings will have to find ways to increase modularity
and portability. Without these changes, NFTs will remain a real
risk: buyers simply cannot know what they have bought, and
they do not know what it means to own a piece of unique digital
property; their intuitions will lead them astray, and they will be
tripped up by hidden code and obscure legal doctrine.
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success, in that the market for NFTs exploded, and a
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virtual objects made during the NFT minting process, an
amalgam of cryptographic database entries, intellectual
property, and social value that attaches to the whole, do not
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